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Focus on Tax Policy: An 
Introduction
By: Professor Annette Nellen, SJSU MST Program Director
This section of The Contemporary Tax Journal includes tax policy work of SJSU MST students. We offer it here and on the journal website to showcase the range of tax knowledge the students gain from the program and to provide a public 
service. We think the analysis of existing tax rules and proposals using objective tax policy 
criteria will be of interest to lawmakers and their staff, and individuals interested in better 
understanding taxation.
One of the learning objectives of the SJSU MST Program is: To develop an appreciation 
for tax policy issues that underpin our tax laws. 
Students learn about principles of good tax policy starting in their first MST class - Tax 
Research and Decision-making. The AICPA’s tax policy tool, issued in 2001,1 which lays out 
ten principles of good tax policy, is used to analyze existing tax rules as well as proposals for 
change. 
Beyond their initial tax course,SJSU MST students examine the principles and policies 
that underlie and shape tax systems and rules in the Tax Policy Capstone course. In other 
courses, such as taxation of business entities and accounting methods, students learn the 
policy underlying the rules and concepts of the technical subject matter in order to better 
understand the rules and to learn more about the structure and design theory of tax systems.
The seven tax policy analyses included in this section join the growing archive of such 
analyses on the journal website (under “Focus on Tax Policy”).
1) Transferability of the Research Tax Credit.
2) Return of the 20% Capital Gains Rate for Certain High Income Individuals. 
3) Surtax on Millionaires.
4) Excessive Compensation – How Much is Too Much?
5) Increase and Make Permanent the Research Tax Credit.
6) Preferential Treatment of Capital Gains.
7) Repeal of the Inclusion of Social Security Benefits in Gross Income.
1 AICPA. (2001) Tax Policy Concept Statement 1 – Guiding Principles of Good Tax Policy: A Framework for 
Evaluating Tax Proposals. Available here. Professor Nellen was the lead author of this AICPA document.
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Transferability 
of the Research 
Tax Credit
By: Erika Codera, 
MST Student
The Credit for Increasing Research Activities (IRC §41) has a long and tumultuous history.  In 1981, the credit 
made its debut in the Internal Revenue Code. 
Congress hoped the credit would help stimulate 
productivity, growth and competiveness of U.S. 
companies.  Since its beginning, the statutory 
credit amount, definitions and formulas have been 
frequently modified. The credit has also been allowed 
to expire and has been retroactively reinstated over 
ten times.  Between January 2011 and January 2012 
there were more than eleven proposals to revise the 
research credit1.  In early 2013, the “Create Jobs 
by Expanding the R&D Tax Credit Act of 2013”2  
(H.R. 120) was introduced. This Act would extend 
the availability of the credit through December 31, 
2014, increase the rate of the regular credit from 
20% to 30% or from 14% to 20% for the alternative 
simplified credit, and allow the credit to be assigned 
or transferred from a qualified taxpayer who earns 
the credit to another taxpayer designated by the 
qualified taxpayer. 
Many agencies have researched and analyzed 
the need for compensation for the spillover benefits 
of research and development (R&D) activities,and 
the strengths and areas for improvement of IRC§41 
and its overall effectiveness. It is clear that private 
market bias against research demands government 
intervention across all sectors to produce optimal 
levels of technological development.3 The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
suggested the need to modify the credit to ensure that 
it is available formarginal projects, with the benefit 
for windfall projects reduced. Marginal projects are 
those which a taxpayer may not invest in without the 
1  Guenther, G. (2011, Nov. 29). Research Tax Credit: 
Current Law, Legislation in the 112th Congress, and Policy Issues. 
Congressional Research Service.
2  H.R. 120 (113th Congress) (2013, Jan. 3). Create Jobs by 
Expanding the R&D Tax Credit Act of 2013.  Retrieved from  http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:h.r.00120:
3 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. (2011, 
Sep. 16). Tax Incentives for Research, Experimentation, and 
Innovation. Retrieved from https://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=4358
tax benefits provided by the government; they are nearly impossible to determine. Projects 
that will be pursued regardless of government subsidies are windfall projects.4
Evidence suggests “the credit has delivered no more than a modest stimulus to domestic 
business R&D investment.”5   Despite this, every Administration has supported the R&D credit 
since its enactment,6 and there is broad bipartisan support for extending the research credit.7 
Policy makers should consider the results of years of discussion and analysis in 
developing their proposals.  It is also important to consider principles of good tax policy in 
developing any proposal.  The analysis below examines the efficiency and effectiveness of 
adding a provision to IRC §41 for qualified taxpayers (small business concerns as defined by 
the Small Business Act) to transfer credits earned under the provision to a person designated by 
the taxpayer.  Under the proposal, amounts received by the taxpayer for the credits transferred 
are not included in gross income.
This paper provides an overview of H.R. 120 (113th Congress) and analyzes it using 
the ten principles of good tax policy outlined in the AICPA Statement #1, Guiding Principles of 
Good Tax Policy: A Framework for Evaluating Tax Proposals.
4 Government Accountability Office. (2009, Nov. 6). Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Tax Policy: 
The Research Tax Credits Design and Administration can be Improved. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10136.pdf
5 Guenther, 2011.
6 R&D Credit Coalition (2011, Jun. 2). Research and Development Incentives in the U.S. and Abroad Submitted for 
the Record of the Hearing on “How Business Tax Reform Can Encourage Job Creation” before the Committee on Ways 
and Means. Retrieved from http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/research_and_development_incentives_in_
the_u.s._and_abroad.pdf
7 R&D Credit Coalition, (2013, Apr. 15). Comments for the Ways and Means Tax Reform Working Group on 
Manufacturing, Retrieved from http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/r_and_d_credit_coalition.pdf
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Principles of Good Tax Policy Evaluation
Equity and Fairness
Allowing the R&D tax credit to be 
transferred for a price would decrease the 
perception of equity and fairness.  The public 
will see corporations that potentially have no 
R&D activities, yet have sufficient profits to 
purchase R&D tax credits, are able to reduce 
their average effective tax rates. Taxpayers may 
feel at a disadvantage because although these 
corporations have high taxable income, they are 
paying taxes at potentially low average effective 
rates.  Only a small number of taxpayers, directly 
impacted by the inherent problem of generating 
credits that cannot be used currently, would 
likely see a direct benefit and perceive the policy 
as equitable and fair.
The policy would also negatively impact 
vertical equity.  Shifting the tax benefit from the 
entity that rightfully earned it violates the ability to 
pay principle.  Although corporations with large 
profits and tax liabilities have a greater ability to 
pay, if they can afford to purchase tax credits, 
they will not be subject to their “fair share” of the 
tax burden.
Earning R&D tax credits without the 
opportunity to obtain immediate benefits is 
unfair. Quite often, small companies invest 
heavily in R&D and have little or no tax liabilities 
for an extended period of time. Such companies 
are not able to materialize R&D credits (in their 
current form) until they generate taxable income, 
which can be years down the line, when the 
need for the subsidy may be lessened. Compare 
this to a large multinational company that has 
income producing activities that can fund R&D. 
Such a company is able to utilize credits earned 
immediately to offset their tax burdens generated 
from existing profitable lines of business. The 
two taxpayers described above are not “situated 
similarly” and, therefore, should have differing 
rules on how the R&D tax credits function. This 
proposal mitigates this horizontal inequity.  
However, the proposal does not eliminate 
horizontal inequity.  The smaller taxpayer 
assigning the credits faces a loss on the 
transaction. It would likely not get paid the full 
value of the credits earned, and it would have 
additional costs related to marketing the credit. 
The larger company buying the credits makes a 
profit on the transaction because they pay less 
than the full benefit they receive and their costs 
to participate in the transaction may be less.  
Similarly situated taxpayers 
should be taxed similarly.
This proposal does not impact the mechanics of qualifying for the credit, calculating the credit, 
or limiting use of the credit. Amounts paid to 
purchase credits are not included in income of 
the seller. 
Guidance would be needed on how to 
treat the costs of the taxpayer acquiring the tax 
credits.
There is some uncertainty as to who 
qualifies to transfer or use the credit.  The ability 
of taxpayers to transfer credits is limited. Such 
limitations increase taxpayer uncertainty. One 
company comparing itself to another company 
may be confused why the rules are applied 
differently. It is not well defined who would be 
eligible to purchase the credits.  The IRS would 
have to issue regulations that would provide 
more detailed guidance.
This proposal does not significantly impact the convenience of payment principle of good tax policy because 
it will not impact the current tax filing and payment 
rules. However, due to increased complexity of 
reporting credits earned, purchased, used or 
sold, there likely will be issues related to timing 
and substantiating credits which will negatively 
impact the convenience of payment principle
A tax should be due at a time or in a manner that 
is most likely to be convenient for the taxpayer. 
Convenience of payment
The tax rules should clearly specify when the tax 
is to be paid, how it is to be paid, and how the 
amount to be paid is to be determined.
Certainty
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Simplicity
The tax law should be simple so that taxpayers 
can understand the rules and comply with them 
correctly and in a cost-efficient manner.
This proposal will cause increases in costs of auditing returns, decreasing the economy in 
collection.  If a taxpayer that uses the credits 
did not earn them, the IRS would not be able to 
audit at that level the nature of the costs or the 
calculation of the credits. When the IRS audits 
taxpayers that earned the credits and sold them, 
if there is a change to the amount of the credit 
that had been previously transferred, it would 
be difficult to collect the additional tax due from 
the purchaser.  Also, the high level of audit risk 
associated with R&D credits would likely impact 
the marketability of the transfers.  The efficiency 
of these transactions would likely be low. 
Several factors of the proposal increase complexity: 
1. effective period is only two years,
2. applicability is limited to “qualified 
taxpayers,” and 
3. administrative burdens and taxpayer 
compliance costs are high.  
Although this proposal attempts to 
simplify the definition of “qualified taxpayer” 
by referencing section 3 of the Small Business 
Act, it complicates this definition by adding 
an additional threshold of average number of 
employees during the year.  
The costs to collect a tax should be kept to a 
minimum for both the government and taxpayers.
Economy of Collection Economy of 
Collection
Economic Growth and Efficiency
The R&D tax credit is designed to encourage investment in R&D, thus making the general provision 
biased. The new marketability of credits may 
cause further distortions in taxpayer decisions.  
This proposal may potentially encourage some 
taxpayers to invest more in R&D activities if 
they have an option of monetizing the credits 
currently. Also, buyers of credits may infuse 
too much funding, causing an inefficient level 
of investment in R&D. These possible effects 
negatively impact the neutrality principle of good 
tax policy. 
Measuring economic efficiency is extremely difficult and uncertain. Because this proposal potentially 
distorts taxpayer behavior, it may impede 
economic growth and efficiency.  However, 
positive externalities that occur with R&D activity 
impact the ability of companies to fully capture 
the financial benefits of their investments. 
Tax benefits are one way to make up for the 
spillover.  This proposal also makes the tax 
benefits realizable more immediately, so it may 
help economic growth and efficiency because 
the influx of cash into businesses will provide 
them the opportunity to invest more. 
The tax system should not impede or reduce the 
productive capacity of the economy. 
The effect of the tax law on a taxpayer’s decisions 
as to how to carry out a particular transaction 
or whether to engage in a transaction should be 
kept to a minimum.
Neutrality
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Appropriate 
Government Revenue
A tax should be structured to 
minimize non-compliance.
Minimum Tax Gap
The tax system should enable 
the government to determine 
how much tax revenue will 
likely be collected and when. 
Transparency and 
Visibility
Taxpayers should know that a 
tax exists and how and when 
it is imposed upon them and 
others
This proposal n e g a t i v e l y impacts the 
transparency and visibility of 
the tax law.  It significantly 
increases perceived 
inequities, increases 
administration costs, results 
in more errors, and is short 
lived, which causes frustration 
for taxpayers and advisors to 
plan transactions and comply 
with the law. The tax base 
and rate are not affected.  
However, shifting benefits 
between taxpayers makes it 
more difficult for lawmakers 
and policy analysts to see 
the impact of the subsidies 
provided by the government 
and determine if the policy is 
effective. 
Allowing the transfer of credits may 
make the determination 
of tax expenditures more 
predictable and reliable. 
Many taxpayers who claim 
credits are not able to 
currently use them, and it is 
difficult for the government 
to know when they will likely 
be able to use them. This 
causes uncertainty in timing 
of tax expenditures
This proposal may encourage non-compliance. 
Taxpayers may be more 
aggressive in their 
determination of credits they 
have an option of transferring 
the credits to other taxpayers. 
Also, because the level of 
complexity is increased, 
unintentional noncompliance 
may increase. The 
consequence of errors 
(whether or not intentional) 
may not be clear.  As a result, 
taxpayers may be more 
careless in their application 
of the proposed provisions.  
Rating summary
Equity and Fairness +/-
Certainty -
Convenience of Payment -
Economy in Collection -
Simplicity -
Neutrality -
Economic Growth and Efficiency +/-
Transparency and Visibility -
Minimum Tax Gap -
Appropriate Government +
Conclusion
The transferability provision of H.R. 120 (113th Congress) does not represent good tax policy based on the analysis of the AICPA’s ten guiding principles. It does not significantly contribute to the efficiency or effectiveness of IRC §41. 
Instead of getting another taxpayer involved in the transaction, the government can make the 
credits fully or partially refundable. The impact of the expenditure would essentially be the 
same; however, principles of good tax policy may be better served. Instead of using the tax 
law to meet the need of society to subsidize spillover costs of R&D, the government should 
consider programs like providing grants or financing, which could be more which  efficient and 
effective in meeting their economic goals. 
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